Mideast Change a Process, Not An Event, Mandates Flexibility
Two issues now at the forefront of policy debate are whether the Palestinians should be afforded a state according to the two-state formula and whether there should be regime change in Iran.
While such clear-cut narratives can be politically useful, they often block innovative thinking and preclude practical solutions.
The debate over a two-state solution illustrates this trap clearly.
French President Emmanuel Macron and voices within Britain’s Labour Party are increasingly promoting the idea that a Palestinian state can be created through diplomatic recognition. This contention (and view) sees the problem as though it were simply one of global endorsement.
In recent statements, Macron has argued that recognizing Palestinian statehood is "the only way to build peace and stability for all in the region."
Yet this approach overlooks the reality that speeches and resolutions alone have little impact without the backing of Israel — the region’s dominant power — and the United States.
Moreover, countries that champion negotiations and emphasize respect for treaty obligations often seem to disregard the clear provisions of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which stipulate that statehood must be achieved through direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
Beyond the political and legal dimensions, there are deeper practical challenges.
Declaring a Palestinian state without first addressing the chronic dysfunction of local institutions, the lack of economic viability, and the persistent divisions between Gaza and the West Bank risks fueling even greater instability.
More cynically, it appears increasingly transparent that the French president and the British leadership are using the Palestinian issue to appease segments of their own domestic populations, where support for the Palestinian cause has become a potent political symbol.
Waving the Palestinian flag has become, in effect, a form of political diversion, much as European leaders have done for decades to deflect attention from unresolved challenges in their own societies.
Past efforts to fast-track Palestinian statehood have repeatedly ended in frustration and cycles of violence.
A formidable obstacle has always been that, within the Palestinian leadership — and even according to polls among Palestinians themselves — there is little genuine support for a two-state solution.
Historically, their objective has been a single state, which is why the chants of "Palestine from the River to the Sea!" only reinforce and intensify their opposition to two states.
It's clearly absurd to call for the creation of a Palestinian state that would exist alongside Israel when, to this day, the Palestinian leadership has refused to condemn the goal to destroy Israel.
A more sober perspective recognizes that any viable resolution requires not only diplomatic consensus but also the challenging work of building institutions and fostering economic development on the ground.
It also demands a transformation in mindset — one in which coexistence with Israel is not merely acknowledged but genuinely accepted and understood as the essential foundation for securing Israel’s acquiescence.
Yes, there should be a consensus that the ultimate objective is the establishment of a Palestinian state. But to ignore the realistic steps that need to be taken to achieve security, and the prospect of prosperity for the Palestinian people within a stable and peaceful nation is to condemn them to more and more cycles of violence.
The question of Iran reflects a similar tendency toward binary thinking.
Although replacing the Iranian regime might ultimately be a desirable goal, it's a mistake to frame this as a project achievable primarily through direct military action by Israel or the United States.
A strategy of sudden confrontation may seem appealing in theory, but the risks are substantial. Any large-scale operation — including strikes on Tehran’s leadership compounds or prisons — carries the likelihood of significant civilian casualties.
Beyond the humanitarian cost, such attacks could trigger missile retaliation against Israeli cities or U.S. assets in the Gulf, reigniting a regional war whose consequences would be unpredictable.
Additionally, there is no guarantee that these operations would achieve their intended objective. Even if the regime’s command structure were damaged, the security apparatus and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have shown resilience and the ability to reassert control in moments of crisis.
For these reasons, many analysts argue that it is more credible to pursue a comprehensive approach over time: combining economic isolation, support for internal dissent, diplomatic measures such as efforts to remove Iran from positions of influence in global organizations, and calibrated disruption of military capabilities.
This strategy is far from risk-free, but it recognizes that regime change, if it comes, is likely to emerge from a combination of internal and external pressures rather than a single military blow.
Equally important is the question of sanctions policy.
While some in Washington, including elements of the Trump administration, have floated the idea of offering economic incentives or partial sanctions relief as a bargaining chip, any such step should be explicitly tied to a clear and verifiable Iranian commitment to end its stated objective of Israel’s destruction.
Abandoning sanctions without meaningful changes in Iran’s regional posture and ideological doctrine would not only reward intransigence but also undermine any broader strategy of containment.
In short, treating both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran through rigid binaries — a Palestinian state proclaimed from European capitals or no state ever; regime change through force or no change at all — has failed to produce sustainable progress.
A more realistic assessment accepts that change is a process, not an event, and that solutions ultimately depend on conditions that cannot be imposed by rhetoric alone.
Mark L. Cohen practices law, and was counsel at White & Case starting in 2001, after serving as international lawyer and senior legal consultant for the French aluminum producer Pechiney. Cohen was a senior consultant at a Ford Foundation Commission, an adviser to the PBS television program "The Advocates," and assistant attorney general in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He teaches U.S. history at the business school in Lille l'EDHEC. Read Mark L. Cohen's Reports — More Here.