Iran: A War of Necessity, or Choice?
Are the current military actions against Iran borne of choice, or out of necessity: vis-a-vis, a genuine looming threat coming from an adversary?
Those supporting what is happening are now even more convinced that they were right.
From their perspective, even if Donald Trump spoke — perhaps mistakenly — in terms of "regime change," the removal or weakening of the leadership of a state they view as a destabilizing, terror-sponsoring power carries an evident strategic logic.
Full-scale regime change may not be necessary, they argue; a diminished and constrained regime, more susceptible to pressure and influence from the United States and Israel, could already produce results — results that cannot yet be measured and, at this early stage, should not be prematurely defined.
On the other side stands a serious and legitimate objection.
The United States was not in imminent danger, and in the absence of such a threat the Constitution requires congressional authorization, before entering war.
This is not a technicality but a foundational principle: the distinction between a war of necessity and a war of choice.
Adding fuel to the argument is the rage directed at the United States and Israel in response to Iranian reprisals that have proved far more effective than many expected.
What makes everything more complicated is countries in the Mideast that have signed the Abraham accords and have been fundamentally opposed to the Islamic republic may not in fact the control their streets.
Populations that have been relatively calm explode into rage when they see that the United States and especially Israel attack anywhere in the Mideast, irrespective of whether a Shiite or Sunni country, and the country under attack rises up and starts to succeed in its counter attacks.
Which of these positions prevails politically will depend less on legal doctrine or strategic analysis than on the media ecosystem and the dynamics of social networks, where narratives now harden faster than facts can even emerge.
Anger at Donald Trump has found its perfect outlet.
What is most striking — and most troubling — is the near disappearance of any space for measured judgment.
Every development is instantly weaponized.
Each uncertainty becomes proof for one camp and treason for the other.
The middle ground is not merely ignored; it's treated as a form of moral failure.
This is not simply a question of political positioning.
When complex events are forced into instantaneous verdicts, it's the extremes that are strengthened. Outrage becomes the standard. Nuance is recast as weakness.
Democratic institutions — which depend on time, procedure, and the capacity to hold contradictory possibilities in tension — are made to appear slow, irrelevant, even illegitimate.
Which position deserves to prevail on the merits is a different question — and one that can be answered only by events in the days and weeks ahead.
The decisive issues can’t be determined in the short term.
How will the Iranian population react?
To what extent can civilian casualties — and American military losses — be avoided?
Will the Strait of Hormuz remain open, preserving the stability of global energy flows?
Will air- and missile-defense systems limit the regional spread of destruction? And could Arab states, for once, act in concert to encourage a constructive evolution inside Iran?
None of these questions can be answered within 24 hours.
Yet it is precisely within those 24 hours that media and social networks deliver their definitive judgments, deepen divisions, and transform uncertainty into accusation.
If they are to play a constructive role, their task is not to pronounce instant sentences but to make patience possible — to restore the idea that the legitimacy, wisdom, and consequences of a war are determined not by the velocity of our reactions but by the realities that unfold over time.
Until that space for reflection is recovered, every crisis will continue to radicalize the debate, empower the loudest fringes, and leave the democratic center more fragile than before.
Mark L. Cohen practices law and was counsel at White & Case starting in 2001, after serving as international lawyer and senior legal consultant for the French aluminum producer Pechiney. Cohen was a senior consultant at a Ford Foundation Commission, an adviser to the PBS television program "The Advocates," and assistant attorney general in Massachusetts. He teaches U.S. history at the business school in Lille l'EDHEC. Read more Mark L. Cohen Insider articles — Click Here Now.
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