Symbolism Doesn't Build Institutions, Security Forces, or Economic Systems
This writer was asked a seemingly simple but consequential question:
"Is a Palestinian state actually possible — especially today, after the antisemitic terror attack in Australia?"
It's a question too often answered with emotion, symbolism, or diplomatic slogans.
Yet one principle should be obvious: the establishment of a new country in a region where conflict is ever-present cannot proceed if its likely consequence is the continuation of violence — including violence spilling far beyond the region itself.
This question is returning forcefully to the center of public diplomacy, and after the events of this past weekend it will fuel intense political debate.
Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., stated plainly that affirmatively declaring a Palestinian state absent the definitive defeat of Hamas and a clear Palestinian acceptance of Israel would only invite further attacks against Jews and against Western values.
Yet at the recent Doha Forum, Qatari and Saudi officials renewed calls for immediate Palestinian statehood, implicitly arguing that a war initiated by Hamas should now culminate in rapid political recognition.
Prominent American political figures participated in that forum, underscoring a widening divergence within Western discourse.
These sharply different lines of thinking expose a deeper divide: between those who see grave dangers in political posturing divorced from reality, and those — including Australia and several of America's closest allies — who continue to demand immediate recognition of a Palestinian state, sometimes with the explicit aim of punishing Israel for what they consider unnecessary civilian casualties in Gaza.
A serious approach must begin with reality.
No Israeli government — left, center, or right — will accept the creation of a Palestinian state if it believes that such a state could become a launching ground for rockets or terrorism.
This concern is not uniquely Israeli.
The international community also bears responsibility to ensure that new states reduce conflict rather than multiply it.
History offers no example of durable peace built by ignoring the security fears of the party that must coexist with the new state.
Yet global debate often treats statehood as if it were a diplomatic switch that can be flipped by declaration.
A functioning state — capable of governing, providing security, and improving the lives of its people — can't be created through sentiment or symbolism.
A Palestinian state may be possible, but only if five difficult and uncomfortable conditions are met. Without them, the discussion remains an exercise in illusion.
First, the Gaza war must be over — and recognized as such in diplomatic terms.
We may not need the language of "victory," but there must be acknowledgment that Israel has restored a basic level of deterrence and security, even as all sides mourn immense human suffering and continue to debate the conduct of the war.
For decades, the region has drifted from truce to truce without closure, allowing extremists to claim that every conflict remains unresolved.
Following Oct. 7, 2023, that ambiguity is no longer sustainable. A sense of finality is not a concession to Israel; it is a prerequisite for Palestinian political reconstruction.
Second, regional signatories must implement the ceasefire framework, while European allies must openly support it.
The 20-point plan endorsed by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will matter only if these governments — individually and in coordination with the United States and Israel — actively enforce, fund, and administer it, particularly the exclusion and disarmament of Hamas.
European governments, though not signatories, must align their policies with this framework rather than retreat into strategic ambiguity.
Silence and hesitation have weakened diplomacy at precisely the moment clarity is required.
Third, symbolic "recognitions" must give way to real state-building.
Leaders such as Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, Justin Trudeau, and Anthony Albanese have pursued symbolic recognition of a Palestinian state that does not yet exist and cannot function.
These gestures serve two political purposes: expressing moral disapproval of Israel and satisfying domestic political pressures.
But symbolism does not build institutions, security forces, or economic systems. Recognition without foundations is not diplomacy; it is political theatre — and it actively undermines the credibility of future statehood.
Fourth, Palestinian leadership must accept that statehood is a process, not a proclamation.
A Palestinian state cannot emerge from devastation without rebuilding infrastructure, reforming governance, establishing credible security institutions, and demonstrating the capacity to manage large-scale aid transparently.
This requires a decisive break from past practices, including corruption, factionalism, and policies that rewarded violence. Statehood must be earned through governance and capability, not declared through slogans.
Fifth, the question of the right of return must eventually be addressed with honesty.
Millions of Palestinians believe deeply in a right to return to homes lost in 1948. Israel cannot accept an outcome that dissolves its demographic identity.
These positions are incompatible.
While this issue may not be resolved immediately, no durable agreement can exist without confronting it directly and soberly.
Ultimately, a Palestinian state cannot be built in opposition to Israel's fundamental security needs. Israel does not need to embrace every step of the process, but it must have confidence that the emerging state will not become a new platform for violence.
That confidence will not come from symbolic declarations at the United Nations.
It will come only from a disciplined framework in which Israel's security is taken seriously, Palestinian aspirations are grounded in workable governance, and reality replaces illusion.
Only on that basis can a Palestinian state become not just imaginable, but sustainable — and only on that basis can the international community credibly confront the global spread of antisemitism.
Mark L. Cohen practices law and was counsel at White & Case starting in 2001, after serving as international lawyer and senior legal consultant for the French aluminum producer Pechiney. Cohen was a senior consultant at a Ford Foundation Commission, an adviser to the PBS television program "The Advocates," and assistant attorney general in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He teaches U.S. history at the business school in Lille l'EDHEC. Read Mark L. Cohen's Reports — More Here.