The basic conflict between governmental complexity and democracy first came to my attention in 1976, when I participated in a summer seminar on democracy conducted by Professor Alfred G. Meyer (1920-1998) at the University of Michigan.
Al Meyer had good reasons to be in favor of democracy and the rule of law, having escaped from Nazi Germany at age 17. His parents died in Hitler's Holocaust.
When the Ann Arbor Symphony later performed Dmitri Shostakovich's Thirteenth Symphony, Al sang in the men's choir required by that piece. The symphony memorialized thousands of Jews murdered during two days in the Babi Yar ravine near Kiev in 1941.
Knowing Al's history, I could only imagine the emotions he must have felt during that performance.
Al's seminar greatly enhanced my understanding of democracy's benefits and limitations. Many of the limitations turned out to result from the complexity of modern government and the specialization that underlies the productivity of modern societies.
My seminar paper exploring the relationship between complexity, specialization, and democracy developed themes later incorporated in my 1981 college textbook, Thinking About Politics: American Government in Associational Perspective. .
The seminar also allowed me to polish up concepts I had been developing since my 1970-1971 sabbatical at the Harvard Law School and recently summarized in a "periodic table" of human associations.
An important implication of this periodic table is that laws — rules of action enforceable by sanctions — must be truly general, applying to the actions of all people. Sanction-enforced rules only applying to some people are in a separate location in the periodic table, and I call them pseudolaws.
"Black people must ride in the back of the bus" is an example of a pseudolaw. Hitler's efforts to exterminate all Jews was another example.
Constitutionalism can be defined as the rule of law (meaning no pseudolaws) plus democracy. It turns out that excess complexity in government is incompatible both with the rule of law, and with democracy.
Complex legislation is probably not general. The more complex the rules, the more they can apply different requirements to different people.
A general rule can and must apply to everybody, but if separate rules pertain to whites and Blacks, Jews and non-Jews, men and women, rich and poor, old and young, a great proliferation of pseudolaws is inevitable.
Due process of law requires that notice be given to people of their legal rights and duties. If these legal rights and duties are too complicated for the average person to understand, it is impossible to give people due notice of what is required of them.
Finally, when government and its operations are highly complicated, opportunities for official corruption multiply. Official activities that would be obviously wrong if legislation were simple become obscure or even invisible in the din and confusion.
American taxes are a major example of complexity run wild.
The incompatibility of excess governmental complexity with democracy is obvious. It is impossible for voters to evaluate alternatives and vote in their own interests when they cannot understand what is going on.
Complexity in government must therefore be minimized if democratic control is to be maximized.
Specialization is often an effective way for people to cope with complexity. Experts can concentrate on dealing with a very limited part of the complexity of modern life. Most people who work for government are therefore specialists.
Ultimate power in a democracy rests with the electorate Unfortunately, the electorate cannot be made up of political specialists. Whenever "dilettantes" (voters) confront specialists (the governmental apparatus), as generalists voters will be at a major disadvantage.
The ultimate strategy for electorates seeking effective control over government must therefore be twofold: 1. constant pressure on leaders to simplify government ; and 2. encouragement of broad liberal education, maximizing the average sophistication of voters.
Voters should regard proposals that would increase governmental complexity — no matter how plausible or noble-sounding the reasons — with utmost suspicion.
Paul F. deLespinasse is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Computer Science at Adrian College. He received his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University in 1966 and has been a National Merit Scholar, an NDEA Fellow, a Woodrow Wilson Fellow and a Fellow in Law and Political Science at the Harvard Law School. His college textbook, "Thinking About Politics: American Government in Associational Perspective," was published in 1981. His most recent book is "The Case of the Racist Choir Conductor: Struggling With America's Original Sin." His columns have appeared in newspapers in Michigan, Oregon and other states. Read more of his reports — Click Here Now.
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