Security, Stability in Syria Still at Risk

Some Syrian Scenarios for Washington to Ponder 

When Ahmad al-Sharaa, the head of Syria's new ruling authority, arrives in Washington, D.C. to be received by U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration, observers are busy trying to anticipate what comes next — what this visit will mean for Syria's foreign relations including, most notably, relations with Israel and the broader implications for the Abraham Accords.

Also under discussion are the respective positions of President al-Sharaa globally and Abu Muhammad al-Joulani (his jihadi nom de guerre) inside Syria, and the transitional authority in Damascus.

The transfer of power from the old regime to the new authority came swiftly, meeting virtually no resistance. It was more of a field coup.

Within just four days, a new reality took shape in Damascus — especially after the coastal region, once the stronghold of the Assad regime, fell without a fight.

These events left the field to armed jihadi groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), supported by Turkey. With ISIS sidelined and no rival Islamist forces of comparable strength, HTS entered the Syrian capital almost unopposed.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) neither advanced nor were permitted to do so. The West opened a dialogue with the new rulers.

Meanwhile, Qatari-Turkish diplomacy skillfully persuaded the United States, Europe, and the Arab states that the forces now holding Syria's institutions effectively were the Syrian state — at least for the time being.

The factions then convened and, in a single session, appointed their own president: Ahmad al-Sharaa.

The West faced a pragmatic choice: either recognize the new government or risk a potential Iranian counteroffensive from Iraq.

Major global firms quickly rushed to fill the vacuum left by Iranian, Russian, and regime-aligned interests.

Huge investment windows opened — particularly for Qatari-Turkish and Qatari-American partnerships, along with companies linked to the new authorities.

These actors together formed a powerful de facto new lobby in Washington with formidable influence.

That alignment deepened when the Trump administration secured massive investments for the US from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

But it was the latter that played the long game—investing politically inside the U.S. and gaining leverage over Syria’s new leadership.

As a result, Damascus now enjoys Qatari-Turkish protection in D.C. through a network of investment firms that have effectively built a diplomatic shield around it.

This new reality became unmistakable when Alawite and Christian areas in Northwest Syria were massacred by jihadi forces and when the Suwayda crisis erupted.

Damascus's forces nearly overran the entire Druze city, and yet Washington took no action to prevent its fall.

Only persistent Israeli airstrikes halted the advance, prompting American diplomatic intervention. The result was a fragile status quo — through the uneasy interplay of U.S. and Israeli interests.

The episodes in Suwayda and the coastal region, together with ongoing pressure on the SDF, underscored that Washington now stands firmly behind the Damascus government, ensuring it does not collapse militarily.

Backed by its corporate lobby, the regime has since secured unprecedented international recognition — addressing the United Nations, being welcomed in Western and Arab capitals, and poised to receive unlimited economic aid.

The Trump administration's invitation for the Damascus leadership to enter the White House marks a historic turning point for the heirs of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda — forces that have chosen pragmatism over jihadist purism.

They have signed economic, financial, and reconstruction deals, and in return gained access to the keys of America’s economic and diplomatic kingdom — and perhaps, to some degree, its defense umbrella as well.

During his historic November visit, President Sharaa received royal treatment proving what some are already calling the "New Umayyad Syria," and it may guarantee regime continuity throughout Trump's presidency.

Yet the regime in Damascus is far from secure. Its rapid transformation — from a jihadist movement to a partner of the West — carries deep internal risks.

It could provoke ideological fissures among Islamists, reminiscent of the post-Cold War split between two camps: the "Brotherhood" pragmatists, eager to benefit from the West, and the hard-line militants bent on confronting it.

The current skirmishes between Damascus and foreign fighters in Idlib may foreshadow the same fate if Syria fails to evolve toward a more moderate government.

Should the central authority crack from within, Syria could face the twin specters of another Sudan or a Lebanese-style sectarian civil war.

President al-Sharaa hosted by the U.S. president, projects confidence and stability.

As the Trump administration prepares for a political battle with the American opposition ahead of the midterm elections, militant factions regroup, Tehran mobilizes its militias, and Israel fortifies its Syria front, the last thing the "new Umeyads" can afford is another round of massacres in the east, south, or west that could unravel the fragile stability.

President Trump has said he recognized al-Sharaa’s rule as "an opportunity to end the crisis." But the ideological rigidity within the regime’s leadership could easily squander that opportunity. In truth, the only chance before this regime is to end its repression of minorities, and to build a pluralistic political order.

Otherwise, Trump’s "opportunity" for HTS may be handed to his rivals.

What the transitional president of the Syrian Arab Republic truly needs is a "Perestroika" of his own — a Syrian-style Gorbachev moment — before the entire structure collapses, as the Soviet Union once did.

Dr Walid Phares is former Foreign Policy Adviser to President Donald Trump and Secretary-General of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group. Read Dr. Walid Phares' Reports — More Here.