By Decoupling from EU, U.S. Can Win Against China in Africa

While many rightfully fret about the state of the Western alliance, it is probably too late to turn back the clock.

Regardless of future electoral results, America now possesses a “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” image in much of the world. America’s unreliability and undermining of a global system created in its image to its benefit are spurring initiatives that were once merely fantasies — including European rearmament and deeper Sino-Japanese cooperation — to proceed at a brisk pace.

Whether one cheers these developments as a necessary shift after too many years of European freeloading in defense spending and welcome’s Trump’s moves to make Europe pay for security guarantees or laments the demise of the post-WWII security architecture that led America to victory in the Cold War and oversaw the largest period of global economic growth in human history is largely immaterial. The changes are happening. The only question now is how to adapt.

In Africa, the U.S. has been losing ground to China while finding itself constrained by the interests and concerns of its European partners. The toxic legacy of European colonialism in Africa meant that anti-European protests often snowballed into anti-American protests because the U.S. did not significantly distinguish itself from European partners in African affairs.

Much to Beijing’s delight, the U.S. found itself defending the sometimes-objectionable activities of European state and private actors in Sub-Saharan Africa. This was most notably showcased when a string of coups in the Sahel allowed Russia to gain an advantage at Western expense, as openings for Russian-backed coups were created by backlash against European activity.

America’s distancing from Europe creates an opportunity to do the same in Africa, with fortunate timing. According to data published by Afrobarometer, the most reputable collector of public opinion data in Sub-Saharan Africa, while many Africans still hold favorable views of China, they have more favorable views of the U.S. and have far more faith in the American model of political and economic development.

At the same time, the least popular actors by far are the former European colonial powers.

This is a drastic shift from approximately a decade ago. At that time, large majorities of Africans professed a preference for the Chinese economic and political model. The shortcomings of the first iteration of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, combined with a decade of hands-on experience with the implications of Chinese influence, have soured African attitudes towards China.

Starting in the early 2010s, China had every opportunity to lock out Western competitors and dominate African markets. It was only Beijing’s missteps and internal Chinese stumbling that prevented this.

Differentiating U.S. and European interests and activities in Africa will require significant retooling, owing to the Trump administration’s decision to trim USAID and VOA funding significantly.

Starting in the mid-2010s, when the first iteration of the Belt and Road Initiative was at its height, the U.S. developed and perfected a strategy of asymmetric engagement in Africa. The strategy was simple: utilize America’s core competencies in peripheral human services and vast pools of human capital and soft power to counter Chinese infrastructure construction initiatives.

For example, if China builds a hospital,train the nurses. If China builds a railway, train its engineers and maintenance staff while trying to introduce American companies to offer long-term support and service the project. When successfully employed, Chinese infrastructure inadvertently spread American influence.

Unfortunately, the actions of DOGE have largely closed off this policy vector. Instead, the U.S. should embrace Africa as a pivotal partner for win-win development and utilize it both as a counterbalance to China and to resolve disagreements concerning Europe.

Being on the good side of the African Union, an entity representing 55 countries across the continent with a population of over 1.5 billion people, is in America’s national interest and vital to containing China. Relations can be deepened with some low-cost, high-impact, socially significant initiatives.

For example, if the Trump administration were to express support for the Accra Proclamation of the African Union and Alliance of Sahel States (Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali), which calls for restitutions from Europe for specific crimes, the United States would gain a lot of traction with the African Union as a whole.

It may also help the U.S. restore influence and ties with the Alliance, which eroded after a series of Russian-backed coups whose security cooperation was vital for combatting terrorism. If the Trump administration were to declare that Europe should handle restitutions independently and not involve the United States in the process, it would put NATO allies in an uncomfortable position and force Brussels, Paris or London to make concessions on a range of issues.

American clout could also push Europe to extradite purported African war criminals being sheltered by some European patrons. This would not only strengthen U.S. relations with African states but also serve as a transactional instrument in foreign policy to extract concessions from European partners while signaling to Africa that Washington, not Beijing, is the only entity capable of realizing their aspirations.

The U.S. can also turn to another of Trump’s favorite topics (and a personal hobby horse of mine): critical minerals. The African continent is rich in these minerals.

If Trump can compel the Development and Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank, International Trade Administration, and America’s nascent sovereign wealth fund to act quickly in Africa, new projects can be initiated, or old USAID and VOA initiatives can be resumed to unwind China’s global monopoly on critical minerals. There are plenty of entrepreneurs across Africa looking for American business partners, not handouts.

The most promising project is in Angola, the Lobito Corridor. This economic route through Angola to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo began as a means of competing with Chinese infrastructure and extracting these elements. Toward the end of the Biden administration, Biden touted the project as a win for American infrastructure, but in reality, the project predated American investment and continues despite America’s intermittent engagement.

If Trump wants to make the U.S. the indispensable power for this project, America needs to be involved. If not, I’m sure China would love another infrastructure project to add to the BRI.

To Angola’s north inside the DRC, the U.S. could also extract huge mineral gains. Rwanda, a country with no significant mines, currently has several mineral export agreements with European states. This is because Rwanda currently dominates the largely lawless areas of the Eastern DRC Kivu provinces, an area roughly the size of New England, utilizing a mosaic of militias and nonstate actors to extract minerals in inefficient and inhumane conditions for export.

In the past, American policy had been to balance between Rwandan initiatives, European sensibilities, and the previously pro-China government in the DRC and mediate conflicts. In practice, this usually meant turning a blind eye to Rwandan activity while intermittently cracking down on the most egregious nonstate actors and terrorists hiding in the anarchy.

Now, without European sensibilities ranking so highly and with plenty of underdeveloped minerals up for grabs, Trump could decisively end the lawlessness in Kivu and simultaneously increase America’s critical mineral supply by decisively supporting the now pro-American government of the DRC in its efforts to regain control.

These are only a tiny fraction of the many opportunities in Africa afforded by China’s eroding popularity and African optimism toward the U.S. These will not last forever. Decisive action is needed.

While reasonable minds will disagree on the optimal path forward, few will dispute that American policy in Africa will benefit from decoupling with Europe.

Wesley Alexander Hill is the Assistant Director of the Energy, Growth, and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center. Wesley is an expert on grand strategy, geo-economics, and international relations with a regional specialization in China, Eurasia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Wesley has unique expertise concerning Chinese influence in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese foreign and macroeconomic policy as well as Sino-American competition. Wesley can also be followed on Forbes, where he is a contributor. Read more of his reports — Here.